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No

less '1ban Che Hundred Years or Argentine Econanic Hietory,
Plus Some Cor!J?arisons
car1os F. n!az Alejandro*
Yale Universit y
1. Im'ROOOCTION

'1he eccnornic progress or the Argentine Republic since about the middle

of the last century rema:1ns one of the rost puzzling and misunderstood national
stories in the developn51t literatur e.

This essay will succinctl y present the

salient facts of the Argentine story and will advance sane interpret ations
regarding Argentine perfonnan ce.

Many

big and difficult questions will remain

unanswered, but it is hoped that the quantific ation of major trends will serve
at least to rule out sane of the silliest non-quest ions and assertion s about
Argentina often found in the literatur e.
It should be helpful to contrast Argentine evolutioo with those of two
countrie s, one which has been ahead of, and another behind, the econanic indi
cators for Argentina.

Many

choices are possible: early this century Argentines

liked to neasure their country's progress against those of the United States or
Canada.

Populatio n size and geograph ical location suggest that Australia is a

more realistic 1'ront-run ner for cooparati ve purposes.
Portuguese advances toward the R:1.ver Plate led to the creation of a new
Spanish Viceroya lty 1n R.lenos Aires 1n 1776.

At least since then a certain

geopolit ical and econanic rivalry has been perceived by many observers between
the camuniti es which today make up Argentina and Brazil.

For the last fifty

years or so Brazil has been catching up with Argentine per capita 1ncane,
o.ffering a suggestiv e contrast to the mediocre .Argentine growth of that period.

.

.
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or

the three countries considered in this essay, Brazil is the oldest

one, economically speaking.
had

By

the middle of the nineteenth century Brazil

already.experienced a rich econom1.c history characterized by export~

leaving behind, besides splendid architecture, little but institutional
ments 1.nim1cal to development.

'lhe

arTal"lge

17th century sugar boan of the Northeast

yielded slavery and latifundia, plus a peripheral low-productivity subsistence
sector. The 18th century gold boom may have contributed to Brazilian national
union, but its impact on sustainable per capita 1ncanes was weak.

'lbe

rela

tively painless way Brazil obtained independence during the 1820s could have
been

expected to facilitate the spread of the industrial revolution to the

tropics, but by the mid-nineteenth century Brazil remained a patriarchal rural
society, its labor market shackled by the peculiar institution.

In contrast

with Argentina, however, the Brazilian state by 1850 had becane a going concern
relying on reasonably finn institutions.

At that tine Cl'lly Chile in I.atin

.Anerica could match Brazilian institutional devel~nt. 'lbe Brazilian geo
graphical vastness and the heterogeneity of its regional economies made the
political achievements of the Brazilian m:marchy the m:>re jmpressive,El.lthough am
biguous regarding their impact on econanic development. Reflecti.M perhaps certain
faith 1n its manifest destiny, that state called itself an enpire.
O'le may conjecture that Argentine per capita incare at mid-nineteenth
century was not far above the low Brazilian levels; by then, however, slavery
had dissolved in the River Plate leaving practically no 1npr1nt either ethnically

or culturally. D..lenos Aires had cane into its own only late in the 18th century
as a result of the Bourba"l. refonns; other parts of what was to becane the
Argentine Republic had "looger" economic histories, but mainly as peripheries

to the

mining

centers of the Perus (including today's Bolivia).

In 1861

Argentina was m::,rc of an en;,ty land than Brazil. 'lllis eq,tiness was regarded

-3both as a key barrier to econan:1.c progress and a potentially fatal geopolitical
naw; Argentine leadership was to be marked by a conpulsion to "people the
wilde1ness" with little regard for delicate benefit-cost calculations. Before
the 1860s what is today the Argentine Republic was made up of fragile coalitions
of regional authorites, jealous of their autonCII\V, and which could have gone
their separate ways as in Central America.
and the West, plus the

growing

Perceived threats from the North

econanic hegenony of Buenos Aires contributed

to establishing national unity, a unity which may be Viewed as a precondition
for the rational exploitation of Panpean land.
D..lr1ng

and

the nineteenth century Australia was far behind both Argentina

Brazil 1r: the development of sovereign political institutions.

The

Australian colonies did not becane a federation until 1901; that federation
appeared to have less centralized control than those of Argentina and Brazil.

Colonial status did not prevent Australia from achieving one of the highest
per capita incomes and substantial 1ndustr1aliza.tion in the nineteenth century,
as w1l1 be seen below.
CKle interesting am little-known aspect of the pre-1860 period in
Latin .America is the early industrialization efforts: which sanet:1mes involved
goveninent support, either Via tariffs or subsidies. Mythology makes Rosas
with his 1832 Tariff an early industrializer 1n Argentina,and sanewhat later the
Baron of Maua undertook ant>itious projects 1n Brazil.

Portales in Chile, and

Francia and the two Lopez 1n Paraguay are even clearer exanples of conservative/

protectionists of the early nineteenth century, paradoxically rediscovered and
glor1f'led in recent years by sare neo-Marxian autl'x:>rs, and by nationalist
historians. These early efforts at policy-induced inport substitution failed.
The reasons ror such f'ailures have not been well documented, except for the
tragic Paraguayan experiment, which was bloodily crushed by the Triple Alliance

.

.

-4of Argentina, Brazil and Urugua y 1n the 1860s. 'nle sharp decline 1n ocean
i're1gh ts plus the British techno logical lead made cal1)et ition with inporte d
manu.factl.lI'6S . very diffic ult.

3. THE BELIE EPOQUE (1860-1929)
'lbe export oriente d growth ma.de possib le by an expanding interna tional

econorey raised per capita inc~ in a sustain ed and substan tial. way in Argentina
since about the 1860s and in Brazil since the beginn ing of this century. 'lbe
vigoro us

sao

Paulo coffee boom of late ninetee nth century was largely offset
by the decline of other Brazil ian export activi ties, such as sugar
and cotton ;
in the River Plate the expand ing export lines m,re clearly offset from an
earlie r period those in decadence, such as salted meat. The Argentine export
quantum rose at a remarkable 4.8 percen t per annum fran 1865 to 1912, and at
4. l percen t per anmm1 fran 1912 to 1928 (rn.Jguez, 1972). 'lhe expansion of the
Austra lian export quantum reached 4.3 per annum during 1870-1913 (Maddison,
1979, p.26).
Table l presen ts estima tes of~ capita Gross Ibnest ic Product (GDP) for
Argent1na,Austral1a, and Brazil . Brazi lian~ capita GDP grot.th could not have
been very s1€1df1cant during the 19th century,given its 1901 level;t he Table sugges
ts
signif icant Argen tina~ capita growth even before 1880. Austra lia,in contra st was
born r1ch;th 1s point is ot'ten forgott en in cooparing Argentina and Austra lia. Vast
minera l resources and scanty popula tion make the Austra lia of the second half
of the ninetee nth century conparable to sane Persian Gulf nation s of today, or
to sane mining states in the West of the United States also in the ninetee nth
centur y. As far back as 1861-65, Austra lian agricu lture, livesto ck, dairyin g
and fisheri es contrib uted only 22 percen t of value added 1n the econaey; mining
and manufacturing togeth er acco'Wlted for 19 percen t, and constru ction 9
percen t.

(attlln , 1962). Che may conjec ture that value added 1n agricu lture and livesto ck

. .
f

'

-5'TABLE 1

Estimates of Argentine, Australian and Brazilian
Per Capita Gross ~stic Product
(In U.S. dollars, of 1970-purchasing power)

1880
1901
1913
1928
1939
1945
1955
1970
1973
1980

Argentina

Australia

,$470
780
1030
1200·
1170
1280
1380
1960
2049
2184,

_$1520
1360
1690
1590
1670
1940
2340
3470
3723
!1022

Brazil

_$139
190
230
340
430
470
670
1100
1459
1924

Sources and rrethod: Est1mates have gone backward and forward, centered
on the calculations for 1970 found 1n Kravis

~

al (1978).

Argentine

data on per capita growth since 1900 obtained fran n!az Alejandro (1970);
CEPAL (1978); and International Monetary Fund (1981).

Brazilian data

s11"lce 1900 obt.::i1ned f'ran F.addad (1980) and L"l.tematiaial Monetary Fund

(1981). Australian data obtained fi'orn Butlin (1962), Butl:in (1977) and
International Monetary Fund (1981) • Argent:ine and Brazilian estimates
.for 1880 are rough guesses based ·on export quantum data.

Data on

Argentine e:xport quant\Jtl are the revised series found in Di~z (1972).

. .
-6in Argentina and Brazil during 1861-65 m.ist have accounted for no less than 40

percent of GDP.
'1he remarkabl e catching up of both Argentine populatio n and rer capita

product relative to Australia n ones up to the late 1920s is hie-,hlighted in
Tables 2 and 3.

Brazil also advances 1n per

capita product but at quite a

distance fran the two tenperate countries of recent settlemen t.

Australia

appears to stagnate for surprisin gly long periods; the aggregate figures,
however, hide an inJ)ressiv e diversifi cation f'rorn a rich but specializ ed mining
and rural econorcy into a m:xiern industria lized country.

Australia also suf

fered unusually harsh weather dtll"1.ng the 1890s.
Of the three countries , pre-1929 Argentina appears to have had the roore

adaptable and diversifi ed export bill.

Iur1ng 1875-79 Argentine exports were

still largely made up by wool, hides, and salted neat.

By 1890-94 wheat had

becone a leading item; by 1900-04 both corn and linseed had becane (each) as
inportant as hides; and by 1910-14 f'rozen beef exports were about as inportant

as wool. Wool, hides and salted meat by 1910-14 anounted to only one-fourt h
of the value of merchand ise exports.

In contrast, the coffee share in Brazilian

exports advaT1c-ed secularly since the last centU.."""J, so by the late 1920s Brazil
had becooe one of the classic exan;>les of export concentra tion.

Much of this

contrast is explained by different natural endowments; Brazilian efforts since
1906 to support internati onal coffee prices plus other policies may have reinforce d
the trend.

Wool remained the leading Australia n export, represent ing 54 percent

of all exports during the 1880s and 43 percent during the 1920s (Boemi, 1979,
p .151).

Gold plus mineral exports accounted for 27 percent of exports 1n the

1880s and 9 percent during the 1920s; between those two decades the wheat share
in Australia n exports rose frail 5 to 21 percent.
'lhe ratio of exports to danestic product remained lower 1n Brazil than

.1n Argentina :

during 1925-29 it

was about 14 percent for the former and 24

''

'
,·'

-7,TABIE 2

,Estimates of Argentine, Australian and Brazilian Populations
(Millions)

Argentina

!861
1880
1901
1913
1928
1939
1945
1955
1970
1973
1980
Sources:

1.35
2.147
1+.92
7.60
11.28
13.95
15.39
18.89
23.75
24.72
27.06
As

.Australia

Brazil

1.20
2.21+
3.83
4.75
6.22
1.03
7.58
9.12
12,51
13.38
14.62

8.55
11.55
18.39
23.66
32.23
40.29
46.22
60.18
92.52
100.56
123.03

in Table 1 plus national statistical sources; United Nations,

Demographic Yearbook, several issues; and IMF, International Financial
Statistics, several issues.

. .
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:I'ABIE 3
Argentine and Brazilian GDP and Population relative to Australia
,(Australia •

Per capita GDP
Argentina
1861
1880
31
1901
57
1913
61
1928
75
1939
70
1945
66
1955
59
1970
56
1973
55
1980
54
Sources: Tables land 2

Brazil
9
14
14
21
26
24
29
32
39
48

100)
Population
~ntina
113
110
128
160
198
203
203
207
190
185
185

-Brazil

713
525
480
518
573
610
610
664
740
752
842

•

-9percent for the latter (data obtained f'ran

Haddad

1980 and D!.az Alejandro 1970).

'Ihe Argentine growth locanntive had less of a low productivity subsistence

sector to drae along than the Brazilian one. 'Ihe corresponding Australian
ratio was 18. percent (Butl:1n 1962), sanewhat lower than the Argentine number
:1n spite of a lower Australian population
subsistence sector.

and

lack of a s1r,n:1.f1cant Australian

A higher Australian per capita :1ncare, a nx:>re diversified

productive structure, and differences in danestic relative price structures

rna.v

help to explain that contrast.
'Ihe

socioeconomic linJr..ages of Australian exports, one may conjecture,

were nore desirable for loog term econan1c and political develoµnent than those
of Argentina, in spite of the apparently m:>re diversified Argentine export
bill.

Gold and mineral exports relied on economic agents and forms of production

sharply different :f'ran those :involved in rural exports; the Argentine export
bill did not ccntain such a significant counterpoise to rural exports.

Australian

mining exports seem to have had powerful forward and backward industrial linkages;

generated interest :1n scientific and technical research;gave rise to a labor
force which rapidly forned trade unions not ooly in m1n1ng but also among
ranch hands; and those trade uni.ens as well as entrepreneurs involved with
min:1ng

coalesced :into political groups opposing the creation of a permanent

landowning class (Hirst, 1979, pp. 87-88 and pp. 110-112; Gallo, 1979, pp.66-67).

We now turn

to an

exam1.naticn of the inputs of land, labor, capital and technology

feeding the export locaootives, as well as of those other

goods

and services

generated by the pre-1929 eca,anies. But first a few words on the institutional
.f'ranework within which eca,anic variables q,erated.

A political and social framework 0all)at1ble with export-or1ented growth had
been settled 1n Argent:1na since shortly af'ter the middle of the nineteenth century.
M111tary C8lll)~s expanded southward the geographical dana.1n of the Argent:1ne
Pepublic during 1879-80,at the expense of 1nd1ans'
that time was

engaged

and

Chilean claims; Chile at

:1n a war against Bolivia and Peru. Brazil had sane

. .
-10inportant evolutionary changes to make in its institutiooal organization as late
as the 1880s and 1890s, when slavery was abolished and the erll)ire becane a
republic.

Australia gradually evolved toward self-rule, but retained strong

ties to the British crown.

'!he external franework for all countries

of the Pax Britannica until the First World War.

was that

Both internal and external

frameworks being on the whole secure and satisfactory to hegemonic social forces,
little public intervention was deemed necessary in the day-to-day operation of
Argentine markets for outputs and inputs.

'Ihe Brazilian state tended to have

a nnre interventionis t stance than the Argentine one, due partly to the
requirements of an orderly abolishnent of slavery.

Brazilian tariffs were

higher on average tha.'1 Argentine ones and the Brazilian
standan:1 was shakier.

ccmn1'tm:!nt

to the gold

Both countries, however, would frequently follow financial

policies \\tu.ch foreign bankers would find appalling.

'Ihe Brazilian republic

was inaugurated with an enthusiastic burst of credit expansion; the Argentine
also frequently noated its currency, a practice then disparagingly labelled
the inconvertible paper standan:1.

In spite of declarations of econcmic liberalism,

provincial and national publicly-owned banlr.s expanded 1n the late nineteenth
century 1n Argentina.

Influential landowners appear to have been the major

beneficiaries of such departures f'ran laissez-faire.

Protectionism was the

I1Dst noticeable Australian departure from pre-1929 orthodoxy regarding rules of
the gar.e for international economic relations.
Both Argentina and Brazil had arrple supplies of raw land to generate their
land-intensive exports.

'Ihe supplies were anple but not perfectly elastic:

the upward tilt in the supply of econanically honDgeneous land was enough to

generate large rents for intra-ma:rg:lnal landowners.

Both oo ! priori grounds and

on the basis of available infonna.tia,, one may cooclude that Panpean landowners
were the major beneficiaries of the great Argentine expansion up to the 1930s.
By 1880 the best Panpean land had been appropriated in a manner leading

to a

coocentrated pattern of land ownership. Chee real estate had thus been distributed,

-11-

an open and carpetitive land market was not at all inconpatible with spectacular
rents falling into relatively few hands. 1tfu1le the Brazilian case is roore
conplex due to its regional heterogeneity, similar conclusions seem to
apply.

Experirrents with colonization schemes centered around family-owned farms

were caITied out in sorre regions of Argentina and Brazil. 'Iheir beneficial
socioeconomic consequences, unfortunately atypical for those countries as
a whole, can be seen 1n the Argentine province of Santa Fe and the.Brazilian
state of Santa Catarina.

In both .Argentina and Brazil landowners, particularly

those producing exportable goods, beca.ITE the m::>st powerful pre-1929 political
actors, and had the m::>st to say as to

how

newly-available land was to be

distributed.
Australian land policies present a substantial contrast to those of the
Argentine. For many years the Br1 tish Crown did not surrender ownership of
Australian land; sheep ranchers failed to get clear titles to their enonoous
enterprises during the crucial fonna.tive years of Australia (Gallo, 1979,
pp. 100-102). ~position to the land ,claims of sheep ranchers came fran miners
and urban groups; ranchers remained an 1nportant political force in Australia,
but me which did not control the governmental machinery as landowning groups

did in Argentina (Hirst, 1979, pp. 83-84). When cereals became an inportant
Australian export, family-operated nedilml-size fanns "'7re relatively m::>re
inportant than in Argentina, where tenant fanning under contracts of about five
years were m::>re widespread than in Australia. A system of rural production where
tenant farriers m::>ved frequently from me region to another apparently was not
harmful for Argentine rural productivity and output growth before 1929, but had

deleterious effects

ai

incaie distributiai as well as a, social and political

life. 'Ille nediocre housing, poor social services and lamentable infrastructural
facilities in most of the nelancholy little towns scattered across the Panpean
r.cne were eloquent testinaly to the rootlessness or Argentine fanning and the

weakness of the rural middle class. Landless tenant farmers had difficulty in

-12obtaining credit and securing marketing arrangements which they perceived as
stable and fair.

With the pattern of land Olll'lership given by political history,· and with
prices of exports, irrports and capital given fundamentally by intematiooal
markets, total rents depended on the cooditioos of labor supply.

Imnigration

policy becaJ'IE the critical policy variable under the control of pre-1929
Australian, Argent:1ne and Brazilian governments, in the sense that public
action could have an irrportant influence on the levels of migration, and that
in tum had powerful effects on the growth and distribution of GDP.
'lbe pre-1929 world witnessed massive migrations, but the "international

labor market" remained se~nted by culture, policy and prejudice.

Chinese

and Indians migrated, but mainly to tropical regioos, Northwestern Europeans
moved mainly to North America, Australia and South Africa.
Brazil (or one should say
of Southern Europe.

Argentina and

Sao Paulo} camected primarily with the labor markets

01.ly via

the Italian labor market were there significant

indirect links with the broader Atlantic labor market; Italian migrants m:.:>ving
back and forth between Santos and Buenos Aires also linked, but weakly, the
Argentine and the Brazilian labor markets.

Australia, :1n cootrast, 11m:1.ted its

connections with Northwest Europe, primarily the Br1tish Isles. While 1t 1s
not obvious that real w-ages 1n IIi::land were above those in I.aribar-dy towa.i~ the

end of the nineteenth century, it is likely that oo average real wages were
higher in Northwest Europe than in Italy and Spain.

Fln:tgrants from the fonner

area also had the choice of migrating to the United States or the white daninioos,
a choice often made by Italians but not by Spaniards.

Ch balance, the m::,re

restrictive A~trallan imnigration policy placed a higher noor under Australian
wages.

'lhis species of labor protectionism probably had a greater inportance

for the welfare of workers within Australia than the celebrated Australian tariff.
But for excluded migrants the contellplation of advanced Australian social
legislation m.1St have been a small consolation.

-13Argentine

and

Brazilian landowners favored and were able to obtain 100re

open 1nm1gration policies.

'!he

Brazilian case is particularly interesting:

after abolition of slavery in the 1880s a large pool of cheap labor existed within
the country, _yet Sao Paulo landowners pressured their state goven-11ent to seek
imnigrants

rran

Southern

Internal migration into
'Ille

Sao Paulo landowners

Europe

and even Japan. Such migration was subsidized.

Sao Paulo remained surprisingly small until the 1920s.
had

transitional troubles deal1ng with free labor

not only in the case of ex-slaves; the Italian govemmant early this century
tenporarily banned subsidized emigration to ffa.o Paulo after receiving reports
of deception

and

mistreatnent of migrants.

Migra.tioo into Argentina required fewer, if any, subsidies.

'!be

country,

with a population of 2.5 millioo in 1880, received 3.2 million 1m:n1grants
during 1880-1910, roore than eighty percent caning from Italy and Spain. '!he
architects of the Argentine liberal program had

hoped

for 1nm1grat1on from

· Northwest Europe, and .f'raned post-1860 Argentine laws, including religious
tolerance, to accoom::>date them.

Sane

came, but Argentina was to

remain

pre

dan1nantly La.tin. Of all 1m:n1grants who came, about two-thirds sta_yed. While
P..rgenti.rie popu1Atioo 1..11c_-r-eased by 5.1 million between 1880 and 1913j that for

Australia rose

only

by 2. 5 million.

Under the influence of the interests of

landowners and the urge to"people the wilderness," Argentina took many of the
gains ar1s1ng

rran export-led

growth in the fonn of higher populatioo; the

labo:r-1nfluenced Australian govennent "chose" to maintain a sa?ewhat stagnant
high

per capita inCCll'E and a low, h<m:>geneous population. Cne may note that

neither Australia nor Argentina received significant n\lllbers of non-white

imnigrants;aane Japanese migrants went to Argentina, but

m?"e

went to Brazil.

Internal migration in Argentina, as in the Brazilian case, was surprisingly

sluggish until the 1930s; it appeared easier during sane of the pre-1929 ~ a n
harvests to bring seasooal. workers !ran Italy than frail northern Argentine

-14provinc es, which contained substan tial pools or workers earning wages below
those luring Italians ·to the Panpas. '!he coexistence of massive 1mnigration
with persiste nt pools of darestic cheap (or cheaper) labor :1n both .Argentina
and Brazil, as :1n the case of the Ulited States of those days, indicate s
that daresti c labor markets were also se~nte d

by

culture and prejudic e, and

perhaps also by policy.
'lhe contras ting Australi an and Argentine interna tional migratio n policies

may be ccnpared to hows~ United States univers ities handle admissions to
their graduat e econanics programs.

care.ful ly, and once

a,e

Univers ity Y attenpts to screen applica nts

1s admitted he or she can practic ally be sure of

financi al and pedagogic support for four years, alrrDst independently of per
.fonnance. Univers ity X flings its doors open but relies C11 canpeti tive exams
to detennine who will stay and be supported after the first or secaid year.
'lhe atnosph ere and feelings of belonging and loyalty among students at Univers ity

Y are likely to present a m:>re attracti ve picture than at Univers ity X. First
year student s at Univers ity X, like jmnigrants into pre-1929 Argentina, will
not rush into "citizen ship" nor will quickly join the "Arrey." But if me could
place all potenti al student s (1mnigrants) behind a "veil of ignorance" regardin g
their prospec ts of admission, me will end up with diffe rent~ ~ opinions
regardin g optimJm admission policie s.
While apparen tly not nuch was done 1n either Argentina or Brazil to
select imn:1grants on the basis of their skills, pre-1929 .Argentina engaged :1n
inporta nt educati alal efforts , particu larly at the level of primary educatio n.
'!he Argentine illitera cy rate, calculat ed as a percentage of the populat ioo

.fourteen years of

age

and older, dropped

census to 36 percent 1n the 1914 census.
remaine d around

rran 77 percent according to the 1869
In 1920, ccrrparable Brazilia n illitera cy

65 percent .

'lhe pre-1929 danesti c capital markets of Argenti na, Austral ia, and Brazil

-15became closely interwoven with those 1n &lrcpe, especially I.aldcn, and later
with that 1n New York.

With cyclical ups and downs,

savings

generated both

danestically and abroad were transfo:rned into railroads, land ~rove!IV!nts,
houses, factories and social overhead capital. '!he presence of fore1@11 capital
was relatively ·1arger 1n Argentina and Australia than Brazil. Jt has been

estimated that the stock of long-term foreign 1nvestnent 1n Argentina 1n 1913
was only 18 percent lower than the equivalent

figure

for Canada; by 1930

Argentina accounted for 12 percent of all British long-tenn investments overseas,
while

Canada

accounted for 14 percent and Australia for 13 percent.

creditworthine ss,as reasured

by

Argentine ·

the market yield of her bonds, was not very dif

ferent from those of Australia and Canada during the 1920s. As late as 1931 Argen
tina was able to roll over a loan at an interest only 90 basis points above the
average rate paid by the government of the United Kingdan; in 1927 Argentine
creditworthines s was ranked by British experts as seventh among fore1@11 countries
(Wortman, 1981).
Associated with foreign capital, but less tightly packaged with it than
in the 1950s and 1960s, cane foreign tecmology and lmowledge of various sorts.
'1he

tricks for running railroads and streetcars, reatpacking and electricity

plants, refrigerated ships and coffee warehouses, were first provided by foreigners.
'lhose tricks provided m:nopoly power, but of a wasting kind; too

many

people,

including Argentines and Brazilians, could provide them sooner or later.

In

the neammile it is likely that 1.nportant quasi-rents were captured by fore1@11
suppliers, feeding the debate as to whether foreigners were exploiting local
residents. Note that nuch foreign capital was placed .1n activities which

came close to being natural nr:nopolles or IOOl'lOpSonies. Railroad and public
utilities were obvious eX8I1i)les; less clear-cut were neatpack:1ng, shipping and
insurance. Note also that such near IIICl'lopolies (railroads) and DlCl'lopsonies
(meat packers) had intimate camercial and financial links with other foreifgl
caipanies, decreasing carpetitiveness not just .1n the nerkets for their principal

-16outputs and inputs, but also 1n a mat of other related markets. British-owned
railroad s and public utility catpanie s 1n Argentina, are said to have bought
coal, rails, and

many

of their other inputs exclusiv ely fran British caipan.1es

with which tl:)ey had camai financi al interes ts, and also engaged in what today

would be called intra-fi im transfe r pricing (Fodor and O'Cn1nell, 1973,p.1 6).
'!he fruits of technolo gical progress generated in the leading industr ial

countrie s diffused into Argentina, Austral ia and Brazil via nunerous·other
mechanisms, besides foreign investments. Imports of capital , interme diate and
constmer goods embodie d nuch of nineteen th and early twentie th century advances
as well as dubious fashioo s; migrants often carried in their hands and heads

new knowledge; ideas m::>ved t'reely :1n nJagaz1nes and books eagerly sought :1n an
age of faith :1n "progre ss." Exarq::>les of the latter with particu larly bene
ficial jnpact oo htmJal'l welfare included advances :1n medicine and public health,
whose diffusio o also involved trips by student s, research ers, and other skilled
persam el.
In both Argentina and Brazil the productioo of exportable goods were

predan:1nantly in domestic hands, 1n contras t with say, Chile and Cuba, but at
least during the ninetee nth century their interna tional marketing remained con
trolled by foreigne rs to a large degree. Argent:1ne cattlemen generated signi
ficant savings and did diversif y their portfol ios, but showed limited interes t
1n investin g "downstream". 'lbey had actively changed livestoc k technology,
steadily int>rovin g cattle herds, but made ally timid efforts to invest in
meatpac k1ng; Argentines were practic ally absent 1n the exportin g of chilled meat
( their presence was greater in f'l'ozen meat exports) • 'lhis behaVior caitras ts
I

with that of 1\.lcuman l.andawners,

woo

.

invested 1n sugar mills producing for

danestic CCl'lSUDpticn. Cne _ , CCl'ljecture that Argentine cattlemen let fore~ rs
handle intemat iCl'lal marketing of their products as a way of insuring foreign
IIU'kets • ftI7 IIILICh

tor

u sane countrie s rely

marketin g their eXPC>rts.

~ cri

transna ticnal corpora ticns

A t'ew large trading ccmpanies danina.te d Argentine
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grain export s; sane were started by Argentine entrepr eneurs and quickly became

intema tiooal cai;,an ies.

Brazil ian coffee-growers si~fic antly expanded

their marketing activi ties since the begirm:1ng of this century .

Uneasiness about the presence of foreign capita l was only of the anxiet ies
genera ted by the pre-1929 export -led growth m:>del. Indust rial activi ties had
advanced :1n both Argentina and Brazil , but not enough according to sane critics ,
includ ing scme :1n the Anned Forces , who associa ted :indus trializa tion w1 th mili
tary streng th and nation al greatn ess.

seems to have

As already noted, the Brazili an tariff

nDre protec tionist than the Argentine one, according to
average levels at least. Both countr ies relied heavily on manufactured ~rts ;
been

machinery and equiIJDent requirements were a.lmst totally supplie d rran abroad.
In the case of Argentina even textile s were predaninantly of foreign or1g:1n;
the Argentine textile :industry curiou sly lagged behind those of Austra lia,
Brazil and Mexico. Austra lian indust rializa tion was encouraged not Cl'lly by
linkag es .fraT1 mineral export s but also by tariffs and other explic it govermient
suppor t.

Austri alian econanic histori ans disagre e as to whether those policie s

advanced or retarde d pre-1929 Aust.."'"cilia.11 develoi::,ment; sane view protec
tion as

a wastef ul luxury this early Kuwait could afford .
Camiercial
tralia , and

exchange-rate policie s were debated :1n Argentina, Aus
Brazil with the usual arguments and by the standa rd actors at least
and

since the seCCl'ld half of the ninetee nth century. As suggested previo usly, the
la,g run develOJXl)ental and distrib utiona l consequences of the debated policy
ranges were probably less than those for migration polici es, which gave rise
to less debate and which have :received less scholarl.v attenti on. 'nle standar d
scenar io natura lly places landowners on the side or free trade, where one also

finds the Argentine socialist party, but not the Australian labor party. It
has

also been argued that 1n both Argentina and Brazil producers of exportable

goods

favored nexible exchange rates whenever international prices of those

carmxiities·were falling, while favoring a return to the gold standard, as a
check to appreciation, whenever world prices turned 1n their favor.

Importers

of goods.and services also favored free trade but preferred an appreciated and
stable currency.

Am:mg

major ~rters of services one may place central govern-

. ments ha.Ving to service their external debt. '!he government also had to worry
about raising revenues in local currency and found inport duties an expedient
mechanism for doing so.

Landowners may not have been too displeased with

rocxierate duties, as otherwise fiscal revenues may have had to caie from land
and other property taxes. Meroories of abusive use of the innation tax during
the 1880s and 1890s 1n both Argentina and Brazil provided political support for
the gold standard during the first three decades of this century; the Argentine

socialist party was an eloquent defender not mly of free trade but also of
price stability and the gold standard.

c:ne

may also note that regional interests

and politics :in both Argentina and Brazil rnay explain the adoption of

SOOE

protective tariffs.
Even if one considers landowners as the daninant innuence on Argentine
and Brazilian public policy, therefore, their enthusiasm for ca?pletely free
trade and nexible currency arrangements had certain practical lim1ts.

Note

also that 1n Argentina the middle class Piadical party controlled the goveninent
-during 1916-30; radical adm:1n1strations introduced (mild) social welfare

measures and expanded state investments 1n petroleum and ra1lroads. 'lh1s has
not prevented sane critics fran tightly associating export-oriented growth with
a skewed incooe distributioo, oligarchical political daninance, a bias aga:inst
.1ndustr1allzat1ai, and a masochistic dependence on foreigners, a canbination
sharply 1n caitrast with the classical English case which iootivated David Ricardo.

..
•

-19To conclude this section let us recaisider the relative Argentine position

at the end of the Belle Epoque. As shown in Table 1, the late 1920s witnessed
the narrowest gap between Argentine and Australian

~

capita incanes. But the

gap remained:_ Argentine per capita incooe has never been ~ r than that of
Australia.
~

Besides data in Table 1 other evidence supports this conclusion.

capita Argentine exports were below those of Australia

during

1_925-29;

Argentine per capita apparent consurrption of cement was about sixty percent that
of Australia in 1928-29; Argentine infant m:>rtality rates were twice as high as
Australian ones during the 1920s, as reported

by

the League of Nations.

The

siz.e, glitter, and cultural excellence of the city of Buenos Aires in the 1920s,
unmatched by any Australian city, may have misled many a casual ccmnentator on
the Australian-Argentine conparison.

It is m:>re revealing to contrast Buenos

Aires glitter to Jujuy poverty or even to the well-fed err:ptiness of Panpean towns,
a contrast not fol.md to the same extent in the m:>re equalitarlan Australia.
4. ARJENTINA SLIPS: .
I:uring

'lHE

1930s 'fflRCXJGH '!HE 1950s

the 1920s the international econanic f'ramework characterized by

a free-trading, cap1tal~xport1ng hegemonic power and by nwtilateralism in
trade and paynents under the gold standard, so daninant before 191Li and so

convenient for the Argentine growth nxxiel, had begun to show serious cracks.
Latecarers to the industrial revolution, such as Gennany, Japan and the United
States showed limited enthusiasm for British rules-of-the-game in international
econanic affairs, and the oldhegenDn was unable to maintain clear leadership.
Hints that pre-l91ZI nonna.lcy would never return came in the 1920s to Brazil
(and to Chile and CUba) more forcefully than to Argentina, whose late 1920s
~

capita exports were the highest (so far) this century. '!he hints turned

into blinding red signals in 1929-1932.

n.tr1ng

the 1930s, the 1940s and well

. into the 1950s, 1ntematiCl'l8.l. eccnanic relations witnessed

nakedly

mercantilistic

-20restricticns to trade and Nnancial nows, breached or lifted ma1.nl.y by arduous

political maneuverlng and the establisl1nent of special patra1-client relation
ships.

Pre-1929 .Argentine ecooan1.c and political history had proVided a

s1.ngularly poor preparation for facing this new dismal international environment.
Before tunung to the gloaey task of chronicling Argentine slippage a reView of
the international links, attitudes, and perceptions generated by pre-1929
experience and harJt>ering adjustment to post-1929 reality is necessary.
At least since the first Panamerican conference in 1889, Argentine foreim
policy had clashed with that of the United States.

Argentina came to view

herself as the other major power in the Western Hanisphere, one whose stra,g
econanic and cultural links to Europe and whose desire for an independent
stand in intematialal affairs, made her skeptical of u.s.-sponsored Pan
americanism. Iuring the early decades of this "American Century" both Right
and Left 1n Argentina criticized United States intervention in the Caribbean
and Central America, and it was an Argentine Foreign Minister who proclaimed the

"calve doctrine" against the extratem.toria l pretensicns of direct foreign
investors, whether fran Europe or the United States. In spite of her close
ecaxrn:1.c ties with the United Kingdan, /u""'gentina

r-ema.L,ed

strictly neut?-al

during the First World War, and voiced opposition to the harsh tenns in;>osed
ai Germany

by the

T.reaty of Versailles. Argentina becane an active and

respected nenber of the league of Nations, adopting what
a " ~ " stance, much
By

JOOre

toda_y

would be called

so than either Australia or Brazil.

the 1920s Argentine trade and payments

had developed

a "triangular

pattem" (enphasized especially by Fodor and O'Coonell, 1973) of minor
aequence 1n a world of convertibility and nw.tilateralism , but
ficulties Cl'lce the international ecaianic system drifted~
principles.

run

CCl'l

of dif

rran those

Argent1ne--merc handise trade sh'Jwed surpluses with the ttlited

K1ngdan (and F.lll"Ope

Jll)?"e

generally) and deficits with the ttlited States.
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Argentine grain exports caq:,eted with those of the United States; hopes that
Argentina would becane a major supplier of meat to the United States were
dashed by the adoption in 1926 of a United States ban oo fresh or frozen
meat inports fran areas with hoof-and-mouth disease. 'nlis measure created new
friction in Argentine-United States relations.

AB the United K1ngdan lost its

industrial dynamism, Argentine inporters tunied to the United States for new
goods; to paraphrase a 1920s slogan, Argentina was increasingl y buying fran

those that did not buy fran her.
'Ihe
by

UK-US rivalry in the 1920s for the Argentine market is symbolized

the coopetition between the old railroads and the new rooter vehicles. The

fonner were mainly British, carried linkages to British exports such as
rails and coal, and generated profits and interest on old Br1tish investments
(but produced meager fresh capital inflows during the 1920s). Auta?Dbiles,
trucks, and tractors were predan:1nantly a United States export, and their
linkages to tires, oil refining, and cement for road building were also danina.ted
by United States interests, capable of providing new capital inflows. Other
traditional British exports to Argentina, such as textiles, were also under
strong coopetitive pressure during the 1920s fran both other exporters, like
Japan, and incipient import-sub stituting entrepreneu rs in Argentina.
'Ihe

stock of British investments generated interest and profit remit

tances which together with payments for other British services, such as
shipping and insurance, were roughly ~ l e to the Argentine export surplus
with the United Kingdan.

Net inflows of capital cane during the 1920s ma1nly

fran the ll'lited States, offsetting the Argentine 1.nport surplus with that

country. When fresh capital

nows

disappeared 1n the 1930s, United States

interests would bitterly catpla1n that Argentine authorities d1scrim1nated
against inports

rran the United States, diverting forei@n exchange to service

old British capital and to purchase old-fashion ed British

goods

(Salera, 1941).

-22Voracious world markets and prodigious Panpean fertility nade both
demand and supply of Argentine exportables seem alnx:>st effortlessly and
1nf1n1tely expandable at least until the First World War. '!hat "easy stage"
of export growth had, of course, to evolve sooner or later into another
where aggressive marketing had to replace passive waiting for the world to
care to Argentina for foodstuffs, and where both public and private efforts
had

to increase land yiea.ds rather than relying oo the extension of the

Panpean frontier to produce more exportables. 'lhat evolution had to

~

even if the Great Depression and the Second World War had not occurred; the
transitioo would have been partly induced by market signals but would have
also required m:>re active public policy in the international marketing of
exportables (involving also support for danestic storage facilities) and in
rural research and extension activities.

SUch an evolution away from a

laissez-faire export policy and toward greater government attention to
and

support for·the production of exportables has occurred at least since

the 1920s in other major exporters of ten;>erate foodstuffs, like Australia,

canada, Denmark and the United States. Note that a more difficult selling
\.

environment and the end of enpty lands in those colD'ltries did not induce then

to tum 8JIIB.Y frorn exporting primary products.
'lhe stoney international ecooanic and political enviroment of the 1930s

Sld 1940s was to severely test not Just the .Argentine econaey but also its polity.

Ulder the democratic govenments of the 1920s there were
.my to
Jn

naws

which opened the

practically W'linterrupted (since 1930) military presence and intervention

Argentine politics, and to governments lacking, except for brief periods,

11.lfTiciently broad and deep dalestic confidence to patiently engage in the
aubtle and cai;>licated international econanic and political maneuvers which were
necessary to maintain substantial per
1940s.

rantta

econanic growth during the 19305 and

-23MaJor chinks in the consti tutiona l polity of the 1920s include d seg,nents
of the Right which never became reconc iled with post-19 16 cleane r electo ral
proces ses assurin g politic al succes s for the middle -class P.a.dical party during
1916-1930; 1nm1.grants who were 1nperf ectly integra ted into the nation al politic
al
and social ille; and poorly -educa ted landle ss rural workers who were politic ally
manipu lated by local bosses .

'!he nondemocratic segJnents of the Argent ine Right

were probably :1nnuenced by events and ideolo gical ferm:!nt occurri ng 1n France
,
Italy, and Spain, and quietly wa1 ted (and prepare d the wa_y) for "the hour of
the sword". '1he Radica l party failed to incorp orate much imnigr ant and working
class suppor t, whethe r urban or rural, and was weakened in the late 1920s by
person ality clashe s aroong major leader s.
'Ire 1930 milita ry ~ d'etat agains t the charism atic but senile Radica l

Presid ent H1p6li to Yrigoyen led to hybrid milita ry-civ ilian caiserv ative regine
s
during 1930-1943, charac terized by variou s degree s of electo ral fraud and
repres sion; to the nation alist-p opulis t Peroni st regimes during 1943-55; fol
lowed by attenp ts to restore non-Pe ronist civilia n rule 1.l'lder militar y tutelag

e

during 1955-1966; then to outrigh t militar y rule during 1966-1973; to a second
brief Pennts t era, 1973-1976; and f1nelly to a return to militar y rule since
197£.

'Ihe secula r trend has been toward greate r instab ility, faster turnov er

of ecooomic policy makers , and a nr>re fra@;lented polity .
A. 'lbe "Infan0 us Decade" (1930-1943)
'!he dismal trend was not obvious during 1930-1943, when hopes for renewed

econan ic and even politic al advances at times seemed justifi ed. True enough,
as shown 1n Table 1, ~ capita GDP fell sllght ly during the 1930s, perfon ning
worse than those of Austra lia and Brazil .

'lhe growth 1n Argent ine and Austra lian

GDPs was 1n fact identi cal between the late 1920s and the late 1930s (l. 7 percen
t
per annum); Argent ine popula tion, however, grew at nearly 2 percen t per annum

during those years, while that of Australia grew at only 1.1 percent per anmm1.
It can be

argued

that, given external circumstances the 1930s Argentine per

fonnance, at least relative to Australia, was reasonably good.

'!he

external

shock to Argentina was more severe than that received by Australia: the current
dollar value of Argentine exports in 1928 was 57 percent higher than that of
Australia; during 1930-34 it was only 7 percent higher; and by 1935-39 it was
10 percent higher (Kelly, 1965,p.51). The volurre of exports

~

capita fran

Australia increased by 9 percent in the second half of the thirties, CCIJ¥)ared
with the first half, whereas in the case of Argentina it declined by 11 percent.
Ruth K~lly concludes:
"Although Argentina falls behind Australia•••its export performance
in the thirties, carpared with the rest of the world, may be coo. sidered satisfactory. Indeed, at the end of the period, it gave
rise to expressions of optimism caicem1ng the col.U"ltry's future
prospects as one of the world's major exporters of agricultlll"al
products 11 (Kelly, 1965, p. 57) •
Argentine exports were hurt not only by the sltmp, but also by the pro
tectiausrn and the discriminatory practices adopted by the lhlted
other industriall~d col.U"ltries.

'!he

K1ngdan

and

grand illusions of the Belle ~ue were

shattered, and Argentina with her triangular trade and payments patterns f0tmd
herself 1n a difficult bargain1ng positioo vis-a-vis the British enpire.
Otherwise amiable Argentines can still go for each others'.throats wher'l discussing whether or not Argentina had realistic alternatives to the htmi111at1ng
P.oca-Runciman treaty, signed in 1933 to ward off further British protectionism,
particularly 1n meat. What is generally accepted is that such a treaty was not
very different fran those 1.nposed by the Nazis on eastern European countries,
and that a tougher Argentine barga1n1ng stance would have had to be accaupanied
by substantial restructuring of Argentine political and ecooanic institutions
(see also Salera, 1941, Chapter III). Ole may speculate that a Per6n 1n 1933
would have made mre sense than 1n 1946,. at any rate, the lbca-Rmciman treaty

.

.
-25contributed to the spread of anti-British and pro-Gennan nat1ooal.1sm throughout
Argentine society, including t h e ~ Forces.
It was noted earlier that before 1929 Argentine exports were a larger
f'ra.ction of qDP than those 1n Australia or Brazil. '!he greater specialization
of the .Argentine ecooaey made her nr,re vulnerable to the Great Depression;
even her manufacturing sector relied heavily on the processing of exportable
primary products.

It is noteworthy, therefore, that the Argentine manufacturing

sector grew between 1928-30 and 1937-39 at an annual rate of 3.1 percent,
,while that of Australia grew at only 1.3 percent per annl.111 (futlin, 1962,p.461;
Naciones Unidas, 1978, pp. 78-79). Sectors of Argentine manufacturing which had
lagged before 1929, such as textiles, "caught up" during the 1930s.

Argentine

cement production grew at an astonishing annual rate of 16.1 percent between
1928-29 and 1937-38; that of Australia grew at 1.6 percent per annum

during

the

same nine years. Apparent cerrent consl.Jn1)tion (local production plus ilrports)
rose during that period at 4.8 percent per annum 1n Argentina and 1.4 percent
per annum in Australia (European Cement Association, 1967). Preferential
treatnent of British industrial exports granted under the P.oca-Runciman treaty
did not block an Argentine jnport-substituting industrialization during the
1930s that was faster than that of Australia.
Both Argentina and Brazil, after initial confusioo and hesitations,
adopted durjng the early 1930s policies which, altoough primarily aimed at

restoring balance of payments equilibrium and aiding 1nnuent1al producers of
exportable goods, cootributed to recovery 1n general and 1ndustr1al.1zation in
particular. 'lhese measures have been discussed elsewhere
1981) • Here

a,e 111\Y

(D!az

Alejandro 198Qa arld

note that the Brazilian departure fran 1920s orthodoxy

was bolder than that of Argentina, although the :remarkable Brazilian industrial

..

C

-26growth during the 1930s, at least double that of the Argentine annual rate,

ma.v also

be

explained by the lower share of manufacturing output associated

with exportable productioo and the mre closed nature of the Brazilian econcxey

at the start of the Great Depression.
One may conclude that the Argentine slippage behind Australia d ~

the 1930s was minor and due mre to external circlmlStances than to danestic
policies.

It may also be conjectured that the Argentine urge to "people the

wilderness" had already cane into conflict with faster per capita growth during
the 1920s, with both Argentine birth and imnigration rates rema.1n1ng above
those of Australia; this was to rena1n the case into the 1940s. While birth

rates in the Argentine Federal Cspital and the Province of Buenos Aires by
the early 1940s were about those for the whole of Australia (less than 20 per
I
thousand)., those for the poorer Provinces, such as Jujuy, Salta and Tuctm:1an

were twice as high.

Table 4 shows that

~

imnigration into Argentina

during

the 1920s reached nearly one million persons, mre than three times the corres
ponding

Australian figures; even

during

the 1930s Argentina witnessed signi

f"icant net 1mn1.gration.
Incane distribution trends

during

the 1930s are obscure, but softer

demand for labor appears to have at least maintained larger differentials 1n
pay between sldlled and noo-skilled labor in Argentina relative to Australia.

Evidence m this point 1s presented in Table 5, which also provides a rough
check m Argentine-Australian per capita incane caipariSCl'lS. Note, however.,
that Table 5 uses narket exchange rates (not purchasing power est1m:ltes) ,
probably exaggerating the gap between Argentine and Australian wages.

C

.
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Net Inmigration into Argentina and Australia
('Ihousand persais during periods shown)
.Argentina
1921-25
1926-30
1931-35
1936-40
1941-45
1946-50

521
456
51
131
53
505

Australia
183
130
-11
43
8
353

Sol.ll"ces: D1.recci6n Nacional de Estad!stica y Censos, Infonne
I

I

Dem::>grafico de la Republica .Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1956) p.28.
Coomnwealth BJreau of Census and Statistics, Quarterly Surrmary
of Australian Statistics (Canberra, December 1950), p.7.
Australian data exclude troop m:>vements.

I
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5

Wages per hour of Adult Male Workers 2 October 1936
Buenos Aires
Rates 1n
CUrrent U.S. cents

Wage
Mechanical enginee ring:
Fitters and turners
Iron DDulders
Patte.mrnakers
Laborer s

Buenos Aires
Wage Rates as Percentages
of those 1n Sydney

0.264
0.261
0.322
0.163

60.6
65.9
67.4
51.7

0.245

0.172

46.8
65.7
68.2
53.1
53.8
60.2
52.4
47.9

Furnitu re making: Gab:inet makers
Upholst erers
French polishe rs

0.276
0.276
0.276

64.5
64.5
64.5

Printin g and bookbinding:
Hand conposi tors
Machine carposi tiors
Machine minders
Bookbinders
Laborers

0.353
o.488
0.310
0.267

0.190

85.3
104.3
74.9
64.5
62.1

Food industr ies; Bakers

0.263

55.l

Electri c power distribu tion:
Electri cal fitters
Laborers

0.282
0.202

59.6
53.4

0.209

55.6
58.7
74.9

Buildin g: Brickla yers and masons

Structu ral iron workers
Concrete workers
carpent ers and j o:mers
Painter s
Pluni>ers
Electri cal fitters
Laborer s

0.236

0.245
0.245

0.248
0.307
0.248

Traru;port

buses, drivers
buses, conductors
Cartage , ITl)tor dr1vers
Railroa ds, goods porters
Ra1.lroads, pennanent
way laborer s
Tram and

~ m and

0.209
0.301

0.193

57.6

0.123

39.0

local author ities, laborers

0.276

78.6

Sinple average

0.257

62.5

Sources : Basic data obtained t'ran Intema tiaial Labor Organiz atiai, Yearbook
of Labor Statist ics! 1937 (Geneva, 1937) p.162. To cawert data in local
currenc y to tiilted tates cents, the followin g exchange rates were used:
.Argent1na:3.26·Pesos per U.S. dollar (average of inport and export rates)
Austral ia: 3.96 U.S. dollars per Austral ian Pound

I
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-29each of the major groups shown 1n Table 5, such as neehanica
l engin eerin g
and buildmg., the gap between &lenos Aires and
Sydney wage rates appears
grea test in the leas t sldll ed category (labo rers) . It 1s
also inter estin g that
Al'gentine workers 1n print ing and bookbinding had the highe
st relat ive wages;
Por

the late 1930s Buenos Aires was the undisputed publi shing
cente r of the
~sh -spe akin g world, w1 th subs tanti al expo rts.
clJr1ng

outbreak of the Second World War place d grea t press ures on
the
Argentine econc:irey and polit y. Within a few nmth s major
European markets
'!he

disappeared, while shipp ing diffi culti es curta iled both expo
rts and imports.
New distr ess was visit ed on the Argentine rura l produ
cers of exportables.,
espe ciall y cerea ls., forci ng the cons ervat ive governnent to
decree a freez ing of
rural rents . Beleaguered Brita in could hard ly supp
ly Argentine needs of
machinery, fuel and 1ntel'T!Ed1ate inpu ts (not to mention weap
ons), and paid
far .Argentine supp lies with incon verti ble and low-yielding
sterl ing.
;rn 1941 the cons ervat ive govemnent creat ed the General Dire
ctora te of Mili tary
Facto ries, estab lishi ng the princ iple of milit ary-r un indu
strie s. 'lhe war
exacerbated div.1.sions with in the gov e~n t and Armed Force
s between pro-A llied
and pro-Axis facti ons; espe ciall y afte r 1941 the
Unite d State s press ured
~ti na into joini ng Pan-American colle ctive actio ns, a
course repugnant
to Argentine dipla ratic tradi tions . Few Argentines wante
d depa rture s fran
neutr ality ., and relat ions with the United State s became tense
, parti cula rly as
Braz ilian -Uni ted State s ties becane roore 1ntim ate.
Pennent with in the Anned
Forces

grew,

anq poli tical groups maneuvered fran tical ly again st the discr
edite d
Ca1Bervative civ1l1a n regime. A rnmt>er of accid ents and
circ1.1?1Stances (mas ter
tully narrat.ed by Pota sh, 1969) final ly led to the
ant>iguous ~d' eta t-of 1943.

-30B. 'Ihe First Peronist era (1943-1955)
'lbe

absolute and relative decline of Argentine foreign trade which had

begun in the 1930s accelerated during the Second World War and culm1.na.ted during
the first Peroni.st era, in spite of the apparently favorable tern1S of trade
for 1946-49, according to available data the best registered this century
(Df.az Alejandro, 1980b,p.9).

Per capita quantum indices for 1nports and

exports are presented 1n Table 6 for Argent1na and Australia; as during the
first thirty years of this century Argentina was a major capital in¥'>orter,
the secular decline of imports is ~what greater than for exports.

('Ihe

Argentine tentlS of trade during the whole period showed considerabl e nuctuation s,
but no significant long-term trend).

Table 6 shows the sharp fall of~

capita inports during the Second World War, sharper for Argentina than for
Australia, and a subsequent recovery; however, during 1950-54 Argentine ~
capita inports were only slightly m::,re than one-third those registered during
1925-29, and about two-thirds of the level for 1935-39. 'Ihe decline 1n the
~

capita Argentine export quantum is continuous 1'rOin 1925-29 through 1950-5'4,

when it reached its lowest point for this century; even during 1945-49 it was
only half the 1925-29 level., by 1950-54 it was one-third of that level, and

less than half of the
~

~

capita export quantum for 1935-39. Australian

capita exports during 1945-54 do not perform brilliantly relative to their

ravorable evolution during 1930-44, as rar as quantities are concemed, but
there is no dramatic collapse, as registered 1n the Argentine case.

Indeed,

the quantitativ e dimensiais of the rise and fall of Argentine foreign trade
DJJSt have few parallels 1n contenporary econanic hi.story; note that 1n 1950-Sll
Argentine

~

capita inports

been at the beginn.1ng of this

and exports were less than half what they had

century.

r

'
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Per capita Argentine and Australia n Merchandise Imports
Exports, Quantum Indices
(1930-34 equal 100)

and

1900-0!J
1905-09
1910-14
1915-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69

Imports
Argent:1na
145
198
195
99
142
186
100
103
51
89
67
69
76
66

Australia
129
138
175
133
150
188
100
160
114
149
212
197
253
331

Exports
Argentina
102
118
103
92
114
121
100
89
62
60
40
44
51
55

Australia
88
100
101
81
81
82
100
109
124
98
94
109
137
170

Sources: For 1930-34 and earlier years, Argentine trade data were obtained
ft'ool Naciones Unidas, 1959, Part I, pp. 15, 110, and ll5.

Argentine data

for 1930-3!! and later years were obtained rran Naciones Unidas, 1976, p.27.
Australia n trade data obtained fran a.ttl1n, 1977; they refer to July-June
years, i.e., 1900 would refer to 1900/01. Population data as 1n Table 2.

-32Table 7 examines

the

relative decline

or Argentine

trade using 1nport

data at current prices, and extends the cooparison to Brazil. 'lhe costs of
Argentine neutrality during 1940-44 are

again

apparent. _ Arter a recovery

during 1945-49, the Argentine relative position sinks again during 1950-54

to alloost World War II levels.

.Argentine

~

capita inports, which during

1930-34 were more than five t:1mes those of Brazil, by 1950-54 were only twice
Brazilian per capita 1nports, and less than one-third those of Australia.

Wh:r did the decline in Argentine trade continue beyond the 1930s?
'1be

cOJll)arison with Australia, and even with Brazil, as well as other

evidence regarding market shares for major Argentine exports, indicate
that general world econanic conditions could not be blamed for the
extraordinary Argentine perfonnance a.rter the Great Depression. Spe:cial
circumstances, such as the droughts of the early 1950s, seem overwhe.J..ned
by the quantitative climensions and persistence of long-tenn trends.
'Ibe answer IJU.1St be sought 1n Argentine policies., which had the net result

of giving low priority to the promotion of foreign trade.
Relevant Argentine policies go beyond those manipulating paraEters
affecting foreign trade. The world of the 1940s and early 1950s could
not be-characterized as one with open and caipetitive intemational markets.
Hot and cold wars, and an uncertain recovery from depression and war
circumstances and mentalities, created international markets which were
politicized and se~nted well into the 1950s. Buying and selling m
those markets and cawerting currencies used 1n those transactions, de
pended

partly

a1

political considerations. 'lhe Argentine vocation for

an autCl'lCIIDus foreign policy made her highly suspect ana,g
especially by the

United

the

Allies.

States, even before the 1943 coup d'etat.

-33TABLE

7

Value of Per capita Ar:gentine and Brazilian Merchandise Inports,
At CUrrent Dollar Prices, Relative to Australia
(Per capita Australian !nports equal 100 1n each period)

1930-34
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79

~entina

3

52
26
56
28
29
23
16
17
16

Brazil

11
12
9
17
14
10
8
6

12
13

Sources: Merchandise ~rts at current dollar prices and population
obtained !'ran International Monetary F\md, International Financial
Statistics, several issues, for 1950-80. For earlier periods the
following sources were used: United Nations, Yearbook of International
Trade Statistics_, several issues; United Nations, Deroographic Yearboo~,
several issues.

-34As during the First World War, Argentine inport s plumneted during
1940-44,

mre than those of Austr alia and Brazi l, count ries Whose milita ry a.]jgr1n
ent
again st .the Axis assured them a greate r now of civili an goods, shipping
servic es and a.rrnanents.
Neith er the Argentine declar ation of war on Germany in March 1945,
I
.
nor the narrow yet stunni ng victor y of General Juan D. Peron
in clean electi ons
1n February 1946, substa ntiall y in;:>roved Argentine-United States
relati ons, which
f

were to remain charac terize d by a great deal of mutual hosti lity until at
least 1950. Unlike Irelan d, Sweden, Switzerland, and even Franc o's Spain

,

World War II neutra ls which adapted to postwar politi cal circumstances
with agilit y, Argentina was to stick to her '"Ihird Positi on," incurr ing
the wrath of innue ntial policymakers in the United States . 'Ihe tangle d
web of Argentine-United States relati ons before and after the end of
the Secaid World War reads at t1mes like tragedy and at t1mes like farce
(see Escu~ ,1981, and Macdonald, 1980) • What now seems clear is that
such politi cal climat e llmite d Argentine markets, e.g., the Economic
Cooperation Administration adopted rran its incept ion a policy of preven
ting
European procurenent with Marshall Plan dollar s in Argentina, and limite
d
or increa sed the cost to Argentina of suppli es of fuel, intenn ediate
and capita l goods (Fodor, 1975), well into the late 1940s. It may be
noted that Argentina not only refused. membership 1n the Intematiooa.1
Emergency Food Council but also refuse d to join the Un1ted Natia is'
Relie f and Rehab ilitati on Administration and the Food and Agric ulture
Organ izatia i,not to nentio n the IntematiCl'lal M:rlet ary Fund and the World
Bank. Argentina did join the United NatiCl'lS at its fowdi ng in San
Franc isco, with the suppo rt of the Un1ted States during a brief spell of

-35rapprochement, but over obJecticris of the Soviet Ulion that the Argentine
regime had been SYJli)athetic to the Nazis.

Dln"1ng

the early postwar years

Argentina defiantly granted credits and exported foodstuffs to Portugal
and Spain.
'Ihe United Kingdom, which during the 1930s used ever:, ounce of its

bargain1ng power to extract concessions frail Argentina, during the 1940s
took a tolerant stance toward Argentine non-allgnment, perhaps

having

no

realistic alternative (nuch of recent writings on United States hostility
toward Argentina dtn"ing the 1940s originates 1n Britain, even as nuch

of the analysis of the British squeeze on Argentina during the 1930s
originated in the Un1ted States).

'Ihe halting British postwar recover:,

aggravated the triangularity problems in Argentine trade and payments.
Britain, and Europe as a whole, was willing to buy Argentine goods using
their own currencies, but Argentina already had acc'LlllUlated large balances

of those pieces of paper which could be used ool.y for llmited purposes
in their countries of origin and not at all to buy goods in the United
States.

'1he failure of the British return to sterling convertibility,

culminating in August 1947, sharply lowered the opportunity cost of
Argentine sterling balances and the ~xpected value of possible future
sterling earnings.

In retrospect, difficulties in the intematicnal econaey during
the late 1940s appear as minor inconveniences oo the road to about three
decades of remarkable expansioo 1n world trade.

a.it at the time a case

could be made that they were a prelude to a new Great Depression or to
World War

m.

Even if those catastrophes could be avoided, it was

unclear whether the protectionist barriers built by industrialized countries ·
during the 1930s, particularly 1n protecting their agricultural sectors,
would be s~ficantly relaxed ooce recovery was canpleted. For

Argentina~ the pattern of agricultural protectionism coupled by SW"essive
exporting of agricultural surpluses which had emerged in industrialized
countries since the 1930s was particularly worriscr.e.
Peronist reluctance to give high priority tot~ expansion of foreign
trade, and to the production of exportable goods, conveniently meshed with its
nationalist-po pulist ideology and its political inclination to reward supporters
and punish opponents.

Urban working class backinr; was consolidated by assuring

plentiful and cheap foodstuffs (another magnet attracting European 1mn:1.grants
during 19116-50), even if the exported share of rural output had to be reduced.
A roore aggressive and optimistic marketing abroad of Argentine rural produce
would have clashed with the cheap food policy.

Passins:?; on favorable inter-

·,,

national postwar prices to producers of rural exportable goods, allowing them
to find on their own external suppliers for their input needs, and letting
those producers make their own guesses as to the outlook for primary product
markets., would have strengthened groups hostile to the Peronist reg:1.rre, e.g.,
rural landowners and old int>ort-e.xport houses.

'Ille revenues generated by the

gove~nt's trading agency in control of exports and 1nt>orts helped to maintain
post-1943 trends toward expansion of military pa..,vrolls, the construction of
military bases and annarnent plants, as well as to underwrite an industrial
development plan., plagued by mismanagement and corruption (Potash, 1980, pp.4-5
and 62-63).

Finally, nations which had imposed unequal ccmnercial treaties and

discriminatory trading practices on Argentina during the 1930s (and which during
the 1940s also engaged in state tradine to maintain their bargaining power) ,

as well as those Argentines who to Peroni.st eyes had collaborated with the
unjust foreign powers, had weaker claims on Argentine public policies of the
I

late 1940s than those who had swept Peron into power.

-37Both domestic political considerations and the bleak international
political and economic outlook were probably involved 1n the Peron.1st neglect
of rural research and extension services, at a time when other producers of
temperate foodstuffs, notably the United States, were experiencing dramatic
technological change in cereals, as a result of canbined public and private
sectors' efforts.

Memories of unsold grain mountains, used during the Second

World War as emargency fuel, and of unusable sterling mountains, weakened
proposals to raise Arr;entine rural yields, which were around United States
levels during 1920-44, but which lagged behind thereafter, especially in com

(n!az

Alejandro, 1970, p.163 and p.194).
The Argentine econaey boaned during

1946-48; favorable export prices

and reserves accumulated during the war, not all inconvertible, may have led to
a Peronist belief that there is''.nothing more elastic than the economy which
everyone fears so much because no one understands it" (Hirsctrnan 1979, p.65).
The

19117 census

was taken during these euphoric times; conveniently a census

was taken in-Australia the sane year.

Table 8 shows the allocation of the

economically active population in the two countries.

One

quarter of the Argentine

labor force was still in the rural sector,· a share substantially higher than
that for Australia.

The gap 1n

manufacturing is narrower.

Although the two

countries show profiles which are not too different, including the participation
of wooen 1n the labor force, that for Australia indicates a higher

~

capita

1ncone.
'lbe

censuses also show that the percentage of the total population

living during

1947

1n cities of nx,re than one hundred thousand inhabitants was

higher 1n Australia (51.4) than 1n Argentine (40.6).

However, the largest

Argentine urban agglaneration, Greater Buenos Aires, represented a higher share
of the country's total population (29.0 percent) than that in Australia, the
city

or Sydney

(19.6 percent).

A large gap separated Greater Buenos Aires

-38TABLE 8

Allocation of the Econanically Active Population, 1947

Percentages of .
Total Economically
Active Population
Argentina Australia
Agriculture, forestry huntjng,fishing
Mining, quarrying

Manu!'acturing
Construction
Electricity, gas, water
Ccmnerce
Transport, storage,conmunication
Services
Activities not adequately described
Unemployed
Total

Wc:men as Percentage
of Population 1n
Ea.ch cate~ry
.Argentina Australia

25.2
0.5
22.1
5.2
0.5
13.3
6.0
21.3
3.1
2.8

15.6
1.7
25.0
7.3
1.0
15.0
9.2
17.9
7.3

5.4
1.6
28.2
1.2
4.6
12.6
3.2
43.4
11.0
27.2

4.9
1.1
22.8
0.6
5.8
31.1
9.6
47.1
25.7

100.0

100.0

19.9

22.4

Source: International Labor Organization, Yearbook of Labor Statistics,
Geneva, several issues. Australian data exclude full-blooded aboriginals,
and allocate the unenployed to sectors of usual occupation.

•

-39/

from Rosario and Cordoba, the second and third largest Argentine cities, while

Melbourne was close in population to Sydney. '1he third Australian city, Brisbane,
had

a share 1n total population (5.3 percent) similar to the canb1ned shares
•

I

of Rosario and Cordoba in total Argentine population (data for this paragraph
obtained fran United Nations, 1952, p.11 and p.213).
~

In 1949 the Argentine postwar boan

to an end. P.eserves had been

drawn down, international prices turned less favorable and dollar shortaee
became extrenely severe:

it was to be the first of postwar recessions induced

by the need to contain balance-of-pa._vments deficits.

Per capita imports and

exports levels, as shown in Table 6, reached their lowest peace-time levels
this century during 1950-54. Manufacturing output, which had Slll"ged

during

the

early postwar years, after 1948 showed sharp fluctuations but a mediocre growth
trend:

between three-year averages centered ar01md 1943 and 1954, the annual

growth rate of manufacturing was 2. 5 percent (Naciones Unidas, 1978).

D::.xnestic

industry was unable to fully make up for the steep decline i n ~ capita
~

in:ports of manufactures. 'Ire fall in the

capita absorptioo of industrial

ccmoodities involved a decline 1n both the cons~tion of consumer durable goods
and investnent in machinery and equ1JJ11e?1t.

Inport substitution 1n 1ntennediate

and capital goods, as well as fuels, turned out to be very troublesome given
the magn.1.tude of the collapse 1n foreign exchange earnings, the ambivalence
toward foreign capital, and difficulties in obtaining foreign machinery and ,
equiprrent, especially during the late 1940s. Arr,entine foreigri policy had a
nai-trivial price not crily in tenns of foregone exports, but also for import
substitutia1 and the maintenance and ex:pansiai of social overhead capital,
especiaJ.1¥ 1n electricity and transport.
'lbe low priority given to exports and other Peronist policies had a
sharp

negative 1nt>act oo Panpean production of rural exportable goods, par

ticularly cereals and linseed, whose

~

capita output in 1945-49 was 57 percent

-40of the 1935-39 level; during 1950-51' per capita production of cereals and
linseed were ooly 46 percent of the 1935-39 level. Livestock.did better;
as labor flowed out of Panpean areas that land-intensive activity actually
had an incentive to expand, in spite of the overall Peronist policies
toward

exportable rural goods. Other rural activities selling overwheJ.minp;ly

in the domestic market, as in the case of roost of those outside the Panpean
area, experienced substantial expansion. Tak1ne; the aggregate of all rural
activities, their~ capita production shows a decline of about 11 percent
between 1935-44 and 1945-54.
is far from spectacular, but

Australian rural perfonnance during those years
~

capita rural production manages to remain

roughly constant (Cooroonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1958, p.ll4).
D.lr1.ng

the early 1950s the Peronist administration realized that the

economic strategy of the late 1940s contained erroneous asswnptions about the
evolution of the international econany as well as inconsistencies am:>ng
targets for growth, industrialization and the balance of payments.

In 1950

a loan was obtained from the U.S. Eximbank. Droughts during the early 1950s
helped
had

to make evident the decay in Panpean agriculture; in 1952 Argentina

to inport wheat.

Steps were taken to encourage the production of exportables.

But as indicated by Tables 6 and 7 the recovery of Argentine trade was to prove
arduous and halting, while the slippage of Argentine E!:!' capita GDP behind
that of Australia was to continue as shown in Table 3, albeit at a slower
place than that registered between 1928 and 1955.

5. A NATICN DIVIDED OOES NC1I' CA'roi UP,

BtJl' GmWS

Even if the steps undertaken to encourage foreign trade recovery, during
the

last years of the Pe~st administration and by following governments, had

been successful in el1m1nat1ng or.sharply reducing policy-induced biases against
productioo for export, the recovery of Panpean agricultlll'e would have probably

-41been less than dramatic. Estanci a hands were unlikely to return to the fann
Cl'lce they had seen Buenos Aires. '!he tractors , fertiliz ers and inproved seeds
needed to replace them would take scxre time to be incorpo rated into production.
Ch average, export incentiv es were larger during 1955-1973 than during
the first postwar decade. fut the policy tilt favoring inport substitu tion
and d1scr1m1nat1ng against exports , whether of rural or manufactured goods,
which became substan tial during the 1930s and extrene due to war circ'LITl.Stances
and postwar Peronis t policie s, remained a feature of the Argentine econaey
throughout 1955-1973.

Argentine effectiv e rates of protecti on rema.1ned anDng

the highest in La.tin America.

Furthennore, incentiv es to Panpean production

tb exports in general followed a saw-toothed pattern , d1rn1n1shing their
power. Why did protecti onism remain so strong after the first Peronis t era,
and

and wh.Y were atten:pts to encourage exports so weak and transien t?
1960 less than aie-fif th of the Argentine labor force was engaged
in rural activiti es. 'lhe Panpean production of exporta ble goods absorbed only
By

part of that labor force.

Furthenoore, the majority of Argentines

living 1n

urban centers , whose budgets were inevitab ly damaged 1n the short-ru n by higher
prices for cereas and beef, perceive d Pmq:,ean producers not as Jefferso nian
fanners but as oligarch 1cal landlor ds, whose large propert ies had emerged
practic ally unscathed f'ran the Peronis t years. Unlike the situatio n in the·
United 5-tates and Western Europe, the Argentine farm lobby could carmand
scanty eootioo al appeal, yet was strong enough to veto measures such as land
taxes, which'could have reconci led efficien cy conside ratiais to equity concerns.
More than two decades of sheltere d industr ializati on had created by
the m1.d-l950s vested interes ts opposing reducti ais in protect ioo, interes ts which

also derived support fran the persiste nce of export pessimism, still prevale nt
at that time throughout Latin America. Perhaps the mst powerful protect ionist

-42lobby centered ~und the Anned Forces, wh:>se officers made up a

good

share

of the executive ranks of state enterprises such as those producing steel
and annarrents. Mem:>ries of weapon shortages during the second world war
buttressed protectionist argLm'lents.
Protectionism and hostility to Pampean rural producers, .then, were
hardly lirnited to the Peronist 100vement. Neither was a strong nationalist
stance toward foreign capital a Peronist nnnopoly; indeed, it is said that
I
ooe of the factors contributing to the overthrow of General Peron
in 1955 was

the -iliscontent caused
oil canpanies.

w1 thin

the Anned Forces by his negotiations

w1 th

foreign

As with export incentives, post-1955 governments zig-zagged

in their policies toward foreign capital, especially toward direct foreign
inves~nt, but on balance foreign corporations were used as key instruments
in expanding industrial production in consumer durables, intermediate and
capital goods.

It is a IOOOt point whether the nnnsters begotten by the coupling

of protectionism and direct foreign inves~nt, such as the inchoate and
spastic autom::>bile industry, were less of an econClllic error than the Peronist
miscalculation s of the late 1940s.

As in other canparisons, the Australian

reco:ro on this issue (especially regarding autanobiles) shows qualitative
features similar to that of Argentina; it is only in the nnre limited quanti
tative dimensions of misallocation that Australia emerges 1n a favorable.ligh t.
'lbroughout 1955-1973 econanic policy was conducted in a turbulent
political atlJDsphere.

'!he

I
exiled General Peron
maintained a large following,

and trade unions were dominated by Peronists. No other single group emerged
to challenge Peralism as the largest coalition 1n Argentine political life;
the old P.adical party split, while conservatives and right-wing nationalists

preferred to rely oo favorite Generals to advance their political designs.

. r'

'

ElectiCl'lS were sporadically held, but Peroni.st candidates were banned by
the Anted Forces.

Weak civilian gove:mments alternated with military ones;

both witnessed a large turnover of econanic ministers.

It may be noted,

however, that until the early 1970s political instability was not accrn;,an1ed
by much bloodletting.

In light of political instability and the limited recovery of foreif')1
trade the 2. 2 percent per annum growth in Argentine

~

.~ta GDP between

1955 and 1973, shown in Table 1, is respectable, and should dispel the myth
of Argentine econcxnic stagnation.

'Ihe Argentine pe£ <tapJ.ta annual grov.th

during 195>.-1973 was of course inferior to that of Australia (2. 6 percent) .
It could be ~ed that Australia, not hav:inp: taken protection to Argentine
postwar extremes, was in a better position to benefit from the bocrn in
international trade which occurred durine 1955-1973, particularly given its
fresh mineral discoveries and its proximity to the fastest growing and most
voracious market for primary products_ e.g., Japan.
the reasonable .Arr;ent:ine ~.£.

~t~

One may speculate that

growth performance during 1955-1973 ma.v

have been the result partly of an Argentine population grm.th rate which for
the first time since 1880 was lower than the Australian one, and partl.v due
to a catching up with the technological change which had and was occU?Ting
abroad, particularly in the production of terrperate foodstuffs.

Indeed, probably

the sjngle mst successM. Argentine public policy since 1955 has been the
support of research and extension agricultural services. Che may also con-
jecture that the significant Argentine P.,er, ~.!.~ growth during 1955-1973
1s of'ten overlooked by unawareness of her low cmten;,orary populatioo growth
(which may be lower than indicated by Table 2, for reasons to be discussed

later), and has been obscured by sharp cyclical savings.
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Until fairly recently, both Argentina and Brazil have been conspicuous
exan;>les of reliance on in;,ort-substituting industrialization as the engine
of growth, with a corresponding neglect of exports. Yet Table 1 yields the
.

'

following annual growth rates 1n their ~r Cf3Pita GDPs, 1n percentages:
Brazil

Argentina
19281955

0.5

2.5

1955-1973

2.2

4.4

1973-1980

0.9

4.1

this contrast 1n growth perfo:nnance, which

Why

has

carried Brazilian

~r ~ita_ GDP in 19~0 near that of Argentina? A first, but partial,
explanation was suggested 1n Table 7: while Brazilian foreign trade languished
for mre than three decades following 1928, it did not experience the postwar
collapse registered in Argentina. This point is brought out roore clearly
1n Table 9, which presents Brazilian~ capita merchandise exports, 1n

current dollars, relative to those of Argentina.
performance

between

A mediocre Brazilian export

the late 1920s and the 1950s was sufficient to generate

a sharp ga:1n in Brazilian per capita exports relative to those of Argentina.
Interestingly, about half of that gain disappears during the 1960s; it is
only during the 1970s that the Brazilian.export drive clearly outdistances
Argentine efforts, carrying Brazilian~ capita exports
positian they reached during 1950--54.

By

beycnd

1980, Brazilian

~

the high relative

capita exports

were 55 percent those of Argentina; 1n 1928 they had been 16 percent.
As

late as 1965-69, the Brazilian export quantll?l

~

capita was about

what it had been during 1928-29 (Nacianes Un1das, 1976, . p. 31), yet Brazilian
~ ~~ta

GDP in 1970 was mre than three times the 1928 level. Inport

substituting industrialization 1n Brazil was clearly mre successful than 1n
Argentina.

A larger danestic nerket, the war-time aJJ1ance with the United

States, and milder species of populism and protecticnism seem doubtful. or

TABLE 9

Value of Per capita Brazilian Merchandise Exports,
At CUrrent Dollar Prices,. Relative to Argentina
I

(Per capita Argentine Exports equal 100 in each period)
1928-29
1930-34
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79

Sources:

17
21
20

26
27
48

42
31
33
47
51

As in

Table 7, plus Naciones Unidas, 1976.

I

t

-46incooplete explanation s for that Brazilian success. ftk>re f\mdamentally, it
should be recalled that during the 1920s Brazil was still a lewis-type
econaey wit}:l a small m:xiern sector, including both exporting and ~rt
carpeting activities, surrounded by a large subsistence sector, producing
non-tradeab le

goods

and services.

Average

labor productivit y was much

higher 1n the roodern than in the subsistence sector; s1m1lar gaps probably
existed also in marginal labor productivit ies.

In contrast, the Argentine

econaey by the 1920s had approached neoclassica l conditions, in the sense
that labor in all major sectors probably had roughly similar marg1na.l
products.
One

may

therefore conjecture that much of the Brazilian ~ capita

growth of the last fifty years could be accounted for by a process not
available to the same degree in Argentina, i.e., a reallocatio n of labor
fi'ail a low-produc tivity subsistence sector to higher productivit y occupations ,

whether 1n;x>rt-corrpet1ng or exporting.

Such reallocatio n would raise the

average darestic product even without an increase in~ capita capitalizat ion,
nor an jmprovement in the technology, of each sector. 'lhat process does not
even require getting the balance between import-sub stitution and exporting
exactly right, so long as an extreme foreign exchange bottleneck is avoided.
'lhe

coffee and other traditional Brazilian exporting sectors have had until

recently few wom.es that supply-side considerati ons would lead them to curtail
their output, nor that the

growth

in the danestic demand for coffee and sugar

would significant ly reduce their exportable surplus. 'Ihe!'e has been an awful
lot of coffee in Brazil siq>ly because there has been an awful lot of
·Brazilian low-produc tivity subsistence fanners and workers.

In contrast,

Argentine populism ~d protectionis m induced a reallocatio n of labor, and
of other inputs, away fran a highly productive Panpean sector toward secondary
and tertiary activities whose superior social productivit y was often questionabl e.

• • I
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contrast between the .Argentine and Brazilian growth perfonnances

is particularly striking for 1973-1980: Argentina 1s far mre self-reliant
in energy than Brazil. 'Ibe sharp decline in Argentine growth cannot be
explained without reference to the bloodiest political tunooil the country
has

witnessed since the 1850s. 'Ibe 1970s saw the brief return of General
I

Juan D. Peron to the Presidency; his death accelerated trends visible
earlier. For the first t:1me in .Argentine history the revolutionary left
became a credible contender for power, proclaiming that "the hour of the
furnaces" had cane; this challenge produced a strong reaction fran conser
vative and middle-class elements. 'Ibe violent struggle between guerillas
and gorillas dwarfed the old Peronists vs anti-Peronists quarrels.
much of the violence occurred

w1 thin

Indeed,

the Peronist movement itself, which

during the 1.970s became even mre of an ideological hodge-podge than it
had been

in the 1940s, as very different factions tried to inherit the mantle

of the old leader.

The

1970s were probably the first decade in Argentine

history when the country becane a net source of migrants; exact figures,
however, are unavailable either for vict:1ms of the quasi-civil-war nor
for net emigration.

Population data "shown in Table 2 for 1973 and 1980

ma..v

represent overestimates.
Brazilian political troubles and violence look mild indeed when
coopared

with those of Argentina, just as Brazilian inflation has never

reached the wild levels registered in Argentina during the last ten years.
While postwar Argentina political life involved strong independent actors

such as trade unions, landowners and sundry military factiais, leading
first to "stalemate politics" and finally.to the violence of the 1970s,
the ccnt1nuity of Brazilian policies has been based on the assurance given
by

a la,g and alm:>st unbroken history of a state dominated by "the right

people". 'lllis could be another CC11Sequence of the large Brazilian subsistence

sector:

its reserve 8I1I\Y of the underenployed together with the other

8n'l't)'

have provided (so far) an unbeatable canb1nat1on for assuring that political
and econanic leadership remains cami:1.tted to unvarnished capitalist growth.
Even as ooce it seemed perfectly natural that the ·Brazilian state should

regulate and watch over the system of slavery, now there is a Brazilian
concensus that the state is an obvious guide and ally 1n the process of
capital accurrul.ation, although the exact boundaries between the private and
public sectors ma..v still generate sane debates. '!he last finy years have
shattered such feelings 1n the River Pla~ where a state once felt strong
enough to tackle growth, 1ncane distribution and national autonaJ\Y' objectives,
achieving little of each. Finally, one may conjecture that Brazilian
geographical heterog-eneity and econanic diversification has len an;>le roan
for conpromises and negotiations buttressing the consensus around the growth
objective, while Argentina is too transparently a Stolper-Sanruelson country
where a zero-sum view of econanic policy is plausible 1n the short and even
the nedium tenn.

6. ENVOI
Did those who emigrated fran F.astem Europe, Italy, and Spain to the

River Plate make a mistake, now being corrected as many of their grandchildren
leave Argentina? By 1970, 1n fact, Spain had reached a ~ capita GDP similar
to that of Argentina, while that of Italy was about 25 percent higher (Kravis
~

!!·, 1978,

pp. 232-236).

Argentine liberal traditions sl'x>uld be credited

with providing migrants and their offsprings with econanic and political

calditialS far superior to those of their countries or or1g1n at· least until
quite recently; Ea.stem &Jrope, Italy and Spain have had troubles or their
own during the years of the Argentine eclipse.

Paradoxically, the troubled

1970s 1n Argentina may have set the bases for political conditions allowing

\

p

steadier and m::,re efficient ecooanic policies.
'!be

nurderous violence of the 1970s was unprecedented 1n the Argent1ne

history of the last one hundred years, and tq,efully it has discredited
extremists both of the left and the right.

A Peronist nr:>vement w.1thout a

charismatic leader may becane a m:>re Oexible and acceptable participant
1n political life.

'lhe

myth that military governments w.111 necessarily be

roore stable and efficient than civilian ones appears hopelessly shattered
1n Argentina.

hours
the

may com;.

Perhaps swords and furnaces w.111 be put away, and quieter
Under conditions of reasonable political stability,

unsinkable Argentine econoozy could recover fran the catastrophes of

the late 1970s and early 1980s, including a high external debt for which
so little growth can be shown.

Abundant foodstuffs and energy resources,

plus an industry which whatever its past costs has shown itself capable
of exporting, provide solid foundations for a growth which may or may not
'
keep up with those of Australia and Brazil, but which could ass\ll"e a good

life to all Argentines.
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